Marksmanship, officer-man relations and the Short Magazine Lee-Enfield
If the triumph at Omdurman in September 1898 symbolises the apotheosis of olo ial a paig i g, the Bla k Week i De e e ust ep ese t its adi .
Within the space of sixteen months the British Army had experienced unparalleled victory and humiliating defeat. In the Sudan 11,000 Dervishes had been killed for the loss of just 48 men. 1 By contrast in South Africa, Boer armies had won three significant battles at Stormberg, Magersfontein and Cole so. This stopped B itai s commander, Sir Redvers Buller, from orchestrating the relief of the sieges at Kimberley, Mafeking and Ladysmith but also prompted a national outcry and ultimately his replacement in January 1900. 2 Omdurman had shown that the traditional approach to fire tactics, built around close order formations and fire by rank and volley, still had a place in the drill book.
Less than two years later, the Boers had demonstrated how, through the employment of open order tactics, skirmishing and independent fire, a more radical vision of battle might operate. 3 In the process, the Boers appeared to vindicate the lo g held philosophies of the B itish A s 'ifle 'egi e ts, philosophies that had framed the technical changes that brought about the introduction of the LeeMetford (LEME) in 1888. 4 The introduction of the Short Magazine Lee-Enfield (SMLE) was not, however, the result of the continued efforts of those in the Rifle Regiments. Rather, and as this essay will show, a number of new voices had emerged in the time between the adoptio of the LEME a d the A s i estigatio s i to the sele tio of the "MLE.
Taking a cue from the work by Stephen Badsey, Spencer Jones and a number of others, this paper examines how attitudes towards marksmanship, tactics and officer-man relations changed as various military constituencies used the development of new rifle technology to frame their battles for institutional survival and organisational power. 5 In the process, what emerges is the way in which the battlefield assumptions that underpinned a traditional approach to rifle usage were challenged and no longer deemed relevant.
By exploring the views of three distinct groups with an interest in rifle technologyidentified here as the Indians, the Cavalry and the Sceptics -this paper considers the underlying reasons behind changes to equipment and training that resulted in the SMLE. What becomes clear is that the pace of transformation, both in terms of technology and technique, had more to do with the appointment in 1900 of the former Indian Army commander, Field Marshal Lord Roberts, to the position of Commander-in-Chief. This reflected the fact that it was not in Africa that the British A s hea i fa t fi st lea t that ope o de ta ti s, skirmishing and independent fire were a necessary adjunct to survival on the empty battlefield but rather on the North West Frontier. At the same time the Boer War cemented a consensus at least in relation to small-arms and fire tactics that had not previously been easy to come by in the 1880s. 6 In particular, and as will become clear, the Cavalry were extremely keen to support the development of the SMLE, primarily because a number of features of the new weapon would help to ensure their continued survival in the face of those who advocated firepower over the arme blanche.
The Indians
Made up of officers who had served either within the Indian Army or as part of a British unit posted to defend India, the Indians were united by their belief in marksmanship skills, independent fire and open order formations. For a long time the Indians had been involved in politicking with Wolseley and Cambridge both in 5 S. Badsey, Doctrine and Reform in the British Cavalry, 1880 -1918 (Aldershot, 2008 , Jones, From Boer War to World War -tactical reform of the British Army 1902 -1914 (Norman, 2012 . 6 Ford, relation to key War Office appointments and also with regards to the distribution of limited resources and arguments over the importance of India versus the rest of Empire. 7 However, whereas the LEME had generated a significant argument within the War Office the Indians had not been consulted at all. This reflected the fact that the Indian and British armies were separate institutions but it was also that many at This was achieved in a number of ways. Firstly, Hamilton set about completely reiti g the I dia A s usket egulatio s. The ha i g ade se e al ha ges to the layout of the four rifle ranges in India he ensured that Indian Army officers and men could for the first time take advantage of the facilities to practise shooting. 16 Musket t ai i g as o lo ge si pl a out st iki g a ull s e e at certain distances but also involved higher instruction on hitting moving objects such as the running deer or targets that sprung up from the ground. 14 J. Lee, A Soldier's Life -General Sir Ian Hamilton, 1853 -1947 (London, 2000 Bearing in mind the reforms put in place by Roberts and Hamilton, Indian Army units, especially when recruited from mountainous regions, were in a better position to face the onslaught. British battalions, by contrast, suffered, partly because of the way in which some were wedded to the drill book and unwilling to learn from their more experienced Indian counterparts. 30 With close order volley fire likely to result in unnecessary casualties, the tactics most appropriate for mountain warfare included skirmishing skills such as the use of open order formation, independent fire, stalking and field craft. 31 As these tactics could not be controlled by word of battalion commanders, officers and men had to be more self-reliant and willing to use their initiative when confronting unplanned situations. Despite their best efforts, however, the Native Army was often let down by the standard of their equipment.
Armed with the Martini-Henry, a weapon which still utilised black powder ammunition, tactical achievements could be undone and positions given away when troops fired their first shot. 32 But technology aside, the Indian Army was in many ways better prepared for warfare in the hills compared with their counterparts in the British Army. (Farnham, 2013) . 30 Moreman, The Army in India and the Development of Frontier Warfare, 1849-1947, pp. 71-72 . 31 Moreman, Evans, p. 46. Given the casualties that occurred in the first year of the campaign, the Tirah expedition caused a considerable shock within the British and Indian military establishment. 33 The response of the Indian Army was to cement an already familiar approach to low level initiative and small unit tactics by issuing a new manual in 1900 called Mountain Warfare. The reaction from the War Office was to appoint Ian
Hamilton to become Commandant of the School of Musketry at Hythe. Accidental injury had prevented Hamilton from serving with any distinction in the Tirah. 34 However, his enthusiasm for musketry made him a natural choice for General Sir E el Wood, the B itish A s Adjuta t-General. 35 Having taken this new post,
Hamilton was in a position to do for the British Army what he had tried to achieve for the Indian Army. At the same time, in terms of the SMLE story, the appointment was crucial for it ensured that an Indian was well placed to express their views on matters relating to small-arms. This was to prove important in 1898 when a smallarms committee was established by Field Marshal Wolseley to look at whether the LEME ought to be replaced. 36 The idea of ha gi g the i fa t s ifle fo a sho te eapo had fi st su fa ed i
December 1895 when Lieutenant Colonel N. Lockyer, the Chief Inspector of Smallarms (CISA), had suggested that the entire Army should use carbines. 37 Carbines had short barrels and were usually issued to cavalry and artillery units that needed personal firearms but whose main role did not involve the use of small-arms fire.
This could put these units at a disadvantage if they were forced to take on infantry in u fa ou a le i u sta es. This as e ause the a i e s sho te a el allo ed the combustion energies created in the firing chamber to dissipate before they had been fully utilised to propel the bullet. Consequently, a typical carbine was effective out to a shorter range when compared to a rifle. On the other hand the LEME carbine which had been adopted in 1894 was 9½ inches shorter and weighed 1lb 33 Evans, p. 35. 34 Lee, . 35 Lee, p. 43. 36 Arnold Forster Papers, 50315, BL. 37 Lette e titled Ca i e i Lieu of the 'ifle f o CI"A to IGO, th December 1895, SUPP 6-651, National Archive (TNA).
13oz less than the conventional weapon and was as a result considerably handier to use. 38 It was therefore easier to pick up and aim: an important consideration when taking snap shots at moving targets.
Nevertheless, while the carbine fired black powder ammunition it would be at a range disadvantage when compared to a rifle. However, during the early 1890s this situation began to change as a safe manufacturing process for cordite -the British design of smokeless propellant -was perfected. All other things being equal, the energy created by cordite was greater than that produced by black powder. 39 As a result muzzle velocities could be increased and bullets propelled with a flatter trajectory. Smokeless powders consequently had a number of tactical advantages. 40 Flatter trajectories meant that soldiers had to make fewer compensatory adjustments to their aim, thereby making it easier to hit a target. This reduced a u itio astage. At the sa e ti e, this e a u itio e su ed the shoote s position was not revealed when he fired. This would not be such an important consideration when fighting against poorly armed foes like the Dervish, but when up against men armed with equivalent technology the empty battlefield phenomenon would be exacerbated.
As Colonel Lockyer had observed these were not the only possible advantages to come from a change to cordite. Faster muzzle velocities also meant that weapons with shorter barrels such as the LEME carbine could achieve similar range and accuracy as LEME rifles. 41 Although cordite propellant was subsequently adopted even for the LEME, Lord Wolseley was not in favour of adopting a carbine for the Lo k e s a i e a d a u e of odified sho te ed Lee-Enfield rifles, the committee made its recommendations. 49 Lighter weapons were preferred because they would make it easier for the soldier to take a snap shot at a moving target.
Achieving this without reducing the length of the rifle would be too difficult. Accordingly, the decision was taken to lighten the rifle by shortening its barrel, take advantage of cordite ammunition but avoid compromising on weapon range. In this espe t Lo k e s a i e suggestio as eje ted e ause its a el as too sho t Before that ambition could be realised, however, circumstances would also have an impact on the Indians and their views on what should replace the LEME.
The Boer War 1899-1902
The Boer War proved to be extremely controversial for the British Army. clearly made an impact with all those who were on the receiving end of its fire.
'o e ts ie o ha gi g ali e as e e tuall a a do ed fo fi a ial easo s. 61
Nevertheless, the fact that he was considering it provides some insight on his views of the battlefield. For, depending on the precise design, changing to a smaller calibre might also relieve some of the logistical constraints that affected the British Army. By decreasing the size of the round it would be possible to carry more ammunition in the supply chain without increasing the overall volume or weight of baggage transported. This was an attractive proposition because, as Lord Kitchener had observed, the men were invariably reluctant to fire independently without direction from officers. 62 I Kit he e s i d the p o le as ot o e -expenditure of ammunition caused by unsanctioned use of the magazine but rather encouraging the initiative of the soldier to open fire when presented with a viable target. 63 It seemed that so much effort had been expended on drumming home the fact that the British Army fought at the end of a lengthy supply chain that it had been forgotten that one of the objectives of battle was to kill the enemy.
One of the d i i g a itio s ehi d the I dia s de isio to adopt the "MLE i
was, therefore, the need to encourage soldiers to make more independent use of their rifles to engage with targets of opportunity. 64 War drove home the need for technical change in order to tighten up the relationship between the design of the rifle and the way it was to be used. Reducing its length and weight whilst removing the magazine cut-off was seen as a means by which a soldier might be encouraged to use his rifle when appropriate. 65 Although the cut-off was eventually retained, mainly because of concerns expressed by native army commanders who valued the discipline of single-shot fire, the fact was that the Indians were keen to remove it. 66 They saw the need to make it easier for the men to use their weapon as dictated by the needs of the battle. 67 At the same time, the number of rounds held in the magazine was increased from eight in the LEME to ten in the SMLE. 68 This apparently minor change meant that troops could generate 25% more fire before having to reload. But it was the decision to provide a magazine charger that really made it possible to increase the rifle s ate of fire. 69 Previously it had been necessary for the LEME to be reloaded one round at a time. This new device held five rounds and made it possible to quickly recharge the magazine. The cumulative effect of all these changes was to give soldiers more flexibility in the use of their weapon, allowing them to engage with targets at a speed appropriate for the engagement. Clearly the logistical concerns advanced by those with experience of Imperial campaigning like Wolseley were not so important to the Indians. Nor, it would seem, did they distrust the soldier in quite the same way as traditionalists like Cambridge.
The enemy, both in India and South Africa, had adopted tactics of concealment based on their superior knowledge of the terrain and their mobility. This was compounded by the way in which smokeless powders made it considerably harder to identify their location. As far as the Indians were concerned a weapon that was Reynolds, p. 81. easy to reload, did not hinder movement and made it easier to bring up to the eye to aim by being both lighter and shorter only served to encourage its use against elusive targets. And in this respect the SMLE was a rifle that, for the first time, reflected the problems associated with the empty battlefield. In conjunction with ammunition that utilised cordite propellant, the weapon was designed to allow the soldier to engage the enemy quickly whilst remaining concealed.
What the new technology would represent, however, was a changed set of social relations between an officer and his man. Soldiers would need to be trained to use their weapon independently and officers would have to rely on them to carry out their allotted tasks in accordance with the demands of commanders. This, in turn, implied that the right sort of man would need to be recruited to become a soldier before being given appropriate marksmanship training. This suggested a greater degree of professionalisation and a greater degree of emphasis on recruiting from the ight so ial a kg ou ds. 70 No doubt these considerations partly explain Major General John French failed to cut off a retreating Boer army. As far as Lord Roberts was concerned, then, the cavalry struggled to deliver the battle winning results some of its more vocal supporters suggested of it.
That is not to say, however, that Cavalry enthusiasts like Sir John French or his chief of staff, Douglas Haig did t e og ise the alue of e gagi g the enemy with fire. On the contrary, and as Stephen Badsey has recently alluded, both officers understood the benefits of firepower, arguing even while they were in South Africa that the cavalry should have a comparable rifle to the infantry. 73 What was important to them, however, was increasing the tactical utility of the cavalry without being redesignated as Mounted Infantry. 74 Consequently, as a number of firepower advocates like Hamilton started to make the case for more Mounted Infantry, French and Haig started to harden their position on the role of the rifle as they sought to defend their position as a separate branch of the Army. In this context it was i po ta t to e phasise the a al s disti t ess etai i g a eapo that F e h and Haig believed summed up the cavalry philosophy, a philosophy that emphasised élan, daring and a willingness to take risks. 75 Unfortunately for the likes of French and Haig who were still in South Africa, when Roberts returned home he was able to use his position to influence how the cavalry would be equipped in the future without facing significant opposition. Subsequently, and in contrast to the preferences of French and Haig, the Commander-in-Chief decided that the arme blanche should be secondary to the rifle. Even though the Cavalry enthusiasts were already talking about switching the mix of weaponry so as to place more emphasis on the utility of the rifle, Roberts had moved to amend the armament of the cavalry. In the face of increasing friction with French and Haig, Lord
'o e ts ould e e tuall ha de his positio i the se i e a ual Cavalry Training . He e he ote a i fla ato p efa e hi h stated his ie s lea l o the role and usefulness of the cavalry and asked that, in the future, training reflect the nature of the firepower dominated battlefield. 76 As far as he was concerned the cavalry ought to have first-rate rifles, not carbines, and emphasise the use of fire tactics in their training over the arme blanche. 77 The lance was abolished except for ceremonial and policing duties whilst the sword would be retained but only as an adjunct to the rifle. 78 In the future the rifle would be kept strapped to the man (rather than in a bucket on the horse) in case the man was separated from his mount. 79 The trooper would as a result be ever ready for dismounted combat. 80 At the same time he would be sufficiently well-trained to use the sword should an unusual situation on the battlefield make such tactics appropriate.
Needless to say the cavalry officers disagreed ith 'o e ts de isio s. The understood the necessity to train the cavalry in the use of a rifle but they firmly believed in the virtue of the arme blanche. 81 In their opinion the problem was not with their role or training but was the result of being equipped with a carbine. 82 Several cavalrymen claimed that having a weapon with a shorter barrel than the the a i e th e dou t o 'o e ts a gu e t that the a al had not dismounted often enough to make effective use of their secondary weapons. 84 The fault was not with the cavalry itself but the poor choice of small arms that they had been forced to accept.
When contextualised this way, it becomes apparent that the main reason why the Cavalry School were keen supporters of the SMLE was because they believed it would put them on an equal footing with the infantry should they be forced to dismount. 85 The encumbrance of having a longer weapon than the carbine could be balanced against the advantage of having the same firepower capability as the infantry. 86 With a wooden hand guard that covered the entire barrel, the new design of rifle not only protected the trooper from a hot barrel whilst he was firing but it also made it more comfortable when it was strapped to his back in the manner determined by Lord Roberts. 87 Adopting the SMLE demonstrated that the cavalry were more than willing to embrace fire action in addition to their preferred modes of engaging with the enemy.
Equally, however, it was important that the Mounted Infantry did not subsume the cavalry. In this respect, cavalry officers had to emphasise the tactical flexibility of the arme blanche as embodied by the ethos of the cavalry. The cavalry were uniquely able to undertake shock action, reconnaissance and flank protection. At the same 83 "ee -'epo ts o E uip e t i "outh Af i a , p. , 'AA. O the a u a of the Ca i e see also: E t a ts f o 'epo ts Wedded to hitti g o e tio al ull s e e ta gets at set dista es, the asso iatio encouraged a view of marksmanship that was invariably at odds with the changing needs of the military. 91 As fa as the N'A s e e ship as o e ed the se i e rifle ought to be capable of accurately striking static targets out to long-range distances. Accordingly, members took a dim view of the SMLE because it did not fit with their ideas on marksmanship and rifle design. In particular they were not happy with the shortness of the rifle, the lack of a wind gauge for the rear sight and the suitability of cordite ammunition for target shooting. Evidently the military members of the War Office, having returned from the war in South Africa, were not prepared to take lessons in rifle design from people who had not experienced the contemporary battlefield.
On the face of it these issues do not appear to say much about why the SMLE took the fo that it did. Ho e e , it ould also e a gued that the "MLE s epti s failu e to make any changes to the way in which both battlefield problems and its technical solutions were perceived says much about the relative power of the Army compared to politicians, the press and other non-governmental actors at that time. Certain members of the NRA had a particular view of the battlefield skewed by their interest in target shooting. This resulted in a reasonable amount of press coverage, stimulating parliamentary questions and some consternation with the Secretary of State for War. 97 However, in the aftermath of the Boer War it was difficult for the critics to get their voice heard or to challenge the decision already made by the Indians and Cavalry School. Consequently, the views of this final group could be marginalised by the strength of opinion within the Army, committed as it was to a handier, lighter weapon with increased rates of fire. What is more surprising is how the "e eta of "tate as u a le to halle ge the A s de isio ith ega ds to the SMLE even though he had support from outside the War Office. Reliant as he was on the advice given him by the Army itself, it was extremely hard for a politician to dispute the choices of the Army.
Conclusion
At first glance the SMLE looks like it is simply concerned with improving the initial design of the LEME. According to this line of reasoning, the SMLE represents the and shorter rifle, making it easier to bring it to the shoulder for snap firing at moving targets. At the same time, if the enemy were unwilling to reveal their positions or were moving quickly, then faster reload times would make up for the increased chance of missing the target. Consequently, the SMLE gave troops the ability to generate fire more quickly and at a pace appropriate for a particular engagement.
The collapse of the Wolseley ring did not, however, guarantee the cooperation of either the Cavalry School or the SMLE sceptics. Given the deteriorating post-Boer
War relationship between the Indians and the Cavalry School, for example, the possibility that consensus would emerge with regards to what ought to replace the LEME was not guaranteed. After all, there was every possibility that a growing mutual distrust could prevent agreement from being reached on the SMLE. What becomes clear, however, is that the two groups could find common cause in the rifle question precisely because it underpinned the institutional survival of the cavalry and did not compel one side to accept the battlefield tactics of its rival. Thus the Indians might have been interested in increasing the rate of fire a soldier could generate but the cavalry were more concerned with demonstrating their continuing relevance to warfare. Echoing the findings of Gervase Phillips and a number of other scholars, the cavalry were keen to find technologies that would enhance their utility on the battlefield in the light of inconclusive evidence about the effectiveness of firepower. 98 In this respect the decision by the cavalry to accept a weapon used by the infantry was a way of maintaining their unique role on the battlefield. For both groups then, the SMLE was acceptable because it left open the tactical possibilities.
Finally, the NRA and the sceptical politicians are an interesting aside to this story primarily because of their inability to affect the procurement process. Outside of go e e t the "MLE s iti s ould only manage to voice their opinions through the press. This might have helped a Secretary of State who had concerns about the replacement for the LEME. Inside the War Office, however, the ability of the Secretary of State for War, was equally circumscribed. Dependent on information provided by his military advisors it was not possible, despite some concerns about the appropriateness of the SMLE, for the government to challenge the Army on its de isio to epla e the LEME. No dou t hat utt essed the A s endeavours in this regard was the knowledge that sooner or later a new minister would come to power and their interests in the new rifle would not necessarily be the same as those of Arnold Forster. At the same time, the language used by the Army to define the tactical problem they faced could not easily be redefined by non-experts. As a result, the sceptics were increasingly locked into a form of debate that made it hard to escape the views of the Indians and the cavalry. When it came to technical matters the Army was the dominant actor while politicians were insufficiently powerful to affect design choices. , 1916 -1918 ', Journal of Military History, 71 (2007 , pp. 99-125.
a epted i ediatel . That Lo k e s suggestio s e e eje ted i poi ts to the fact that a number of contingent events shaped the selection of the weapon.
Whereas the LEME was born out of a debate between those who held on to the idea of firing in volleys by rank and file and those who were more concerned about logistics and officer-man relations, the SMLE was the technological representation of change in the social attitudes of the Army. The weapon was designed to encourage the soldier to use his weapon independently of his officer. As such it relied on the good judgement of the man behind the rifle. However, this could only be acceptable Frontier.
